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Flip-Flopping, Primary Visibility, 
and the Selection of Candidates†
By Marina Agranov*
We present an incomplete information model of two-stage elections 
in which candidates can choose different platforms in primaries 
and general elections. Voters do not directly observe the chosen 
platforms, but infer the candidates’ ideologies from observing 
candidates’ campaigns. The ability of voters to detect candidates’ 
types depends on the visibility of the race. This model captures two 
patterns: the post-primary moderation effect, in which candidates 
pander to the party base during the primary and shift to the center in 
the general election; and the divisive-primary effect, which refers to 
the detrimental effect of hard-fought primaries on a party’s general-
election prospects. (JEL D11, D72, D83)
Political primaries, an influential institution in the American political process, require candidates to obtain a party nomination by vote in order to compete 
in the general election. Two established facts about primaries are that candidates 
tend to pander to the party base during primaries and moderate their platforms 
after securing the nomination;1 and more prominent and, thus, hard-fought prima-
ries can influence a party’s chances of winning the election.2 The first observation, 
“post-primary moderation,” follows from the premise that primary voters hold more 
extreme political views than the general-election voters. The second observation, 
the so-called “divisive-primary” hypothesis, suggests that a candidate’s prospects in 
a general election may be affected by the visibility of the primary race.
1 Using US congressional data, Burden (2001) shows that candidates adopt more extreme positions in primaries 
than in general elections. 
2 The conventional wisdom that hotly contested primaries can damage a party’s chances in the general elec-
tion is based on the theoretical work of Key (1952). Empirical literature that studies this conjecture has produced 
mixed results: Abramowitz (1988); Bernstein (1977); and Lengle, Owen, and Sonner (1995) find that prominent 
primaries hurt candidates in the general elections. Alvarez, Canon, and Sellers (1995) and Westlye (1991) find that 
prominent primaries help candidates in the general election. Atkenson (1998) and Kenney (1988) find that general 
election prospects are not affected by the primary visibility. Finally, Born (1981) and Hogan (2003) find a mixed 
relationship. In this paper, we use theoretical analysis to shed light on the relationship between the visibility of the 
nomination process and general election outcomes. The mechanism studied here delivers a negative correlation; i.e., 
it shows that prominent primaries are detrimental to a party’s chances of winning general elections. 
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These two observations hardly seem surprising. Despite this, the theoretical liter-
ature lacks a model that can deliver both of these results simultaneously. The reason 
is that most existing models use one of two extreme assumptions: either that can-
didates make binding commitments to electoral platforms (as in Downs 1957 and 
Hotelling 1929),3 or that announcements made by candidates are purely cheap talk 
(as in Alesina 1988). If a candidate commits to a platform, then the mere fact of 
commitment precludes moderation. If a candidate has no access to a commitment 
technology, then his general-election prospects should not be affected by the visibil-
ity of the primary race. Thus, a model with either of these two assumptions cannot 
explain both the post-primary moderation and the divisive-primary effect.
In this paper, we develop a model of two-stage electoral competition that captures 
both the post-primary shift and the divisive-primary effect. In our model, candidates 
have policy preferences and a partial commitment to these policies, which is cap-
tured by incorporating costs of lying as well as by having the candidates’ platforms 
revealed imperfectly. Voters are forward-looking and take into account that a more 
extreme candidate has a smaller chance of winning the general election than a mod-
erate one does. However, voters do not observe candidates’ true ideological posi-
tions (types) and try to infer them from platforms candidates campaign on. Voters’ 
ability to detect candidates’ types are affected by the properties of the scrutiny func-
tion and summarized by prominence or visibility of a race, which measures the 
informativeness of a race. The more prominent the race is, the more likely voters are 
to learn the true type of a candidate. The candidates strategically choose campaign 
platforms depending on their levels of visibility, and, as a result, candidates’ true 
preferences are partially revealed.
In equilibrium, candidates “flip-flop” by pandering to the median voter of the 
primary race during the primary and then shifting to the center once the nomination 
is obtained. In the primary, voters elect a candidate they believe to be more extreme. 
The extent to which candidates mimic each other depends on the costs of lying and 
the visibility of each stage. We show that in this equilibrium an increase in the pri-
mary visibility lowers the chances of the party holding it to win the general election. 
This is because prominent primaries increase the chances of moderate candidates 
to lose the nomination and decrease the chances of extreme challengers to win the 
general election.
The basic model studied in this paper treats the visibility of a race as an exog-
enous parameter and assumes that all voters (even those who do not participate in 
the primary election) observe primary campaigns. In Section IV, we consider two 
extensions of this basic model in which we relax each of these assumptions. In the 
first extension we investigate robustness of pandering behavior of candidates to the 
changes in the information structure. In particular, we consider the election game, in 
which voters who do not take part in the primary election are ignorant about events 
that have transpired during primary campaigns, and, therefore, hold beliefs that are 
3 See also Wittman (1983) who studies a one-stage election model with policy-motivated candidates and 
Coleman (1972) who investigates a two-stage election model with office-motivated candidates. The main assump-
tion in this class of models is that candidates choose one position, at the beginning of the election, and this position 
will be implemented if they get elected. 
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different from voters who take part in the primary election. We show that pandering 
equilibrium is robust to this change in the information structure and flip-flopping 
equilibrium exists in the election game with partially informative primaries. Our 
second extension explores how primary visibility is determined. Here we consider 
a model in which candidates can influence primary visibility via costly investment 
that precedes the primary race. We show that in this setup, there exists a separating 
equilibrium in which extreme candidates invest in boosting primary visibility, while 
moderate ones refrain from doing so.
Our model belongs to the class of signal-jamming models, as coined by Fudenberg 
and Tirole (1986). In both election stages, some types of politicians try not to signal 
information about themselves by generating a jammed signal, which interferes with 
the inference problem faced by voters. In the primaries, it is moderate politicians 
who prefer to conceal their type from the voters, while in the general election it is 
politicians with more extreme views. The reason politicians engage in signal jam-
ming is the trade-off that candidates face: the probability of winning versus the pol-
icy outcome should you win. This trade-off is the classical one in political economy 
and has been explored by Downs (1957), Wittman (1983), Calvert (1985), and many 
other models. The difference in this paper is that this trade-off is being made by the 
median voter of the primary election rather than the candidate herself. To execute 
the trade-off, the primary median has to learn the type of candidate he is nominating. 
This selection problem itself induces a trade-off: the primary median wants to nomi-
nate a more extreme type (which is closer to his policy preferences) but as he learns 
whether a candidate is extreme or not, so too does the general election median. This 
lowers the probability further that an extreme nominee will win the general election 
both directly and indirectly. The indirect effect is that a candidate that is strongly 
perceived to be extreme will pander less to the general election median.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. We survey the related literature at 
the end of this section. Section I lays out the model. In Section II we characterize the 
pandering equilibrium. In Section III we obtain comparative statics results. Section 
IV presents two extensions of the basic model, and, finally, in Section V we offer 
some conclusions.
related Literature.—Our model belongs to the literature that studies informa-
tion transmission in elections. This literature is vast, and can be broadly divided 
into two classes of models. The first class includes voting games with incomplete 
information, in which voters attempt to signal information to the candidates in order 
to influence policy choices (see Piketty 2000, Razin 2003, Meirowitz 2005, Shotts 
2006, and Meirowitz and Shotts 2009). Within this class of models, the paper which 
is most closely related to ours is that of Meirowitz (2005) who studies two-stage 
elections, in which candidates’ policy preferences are common knowledge while 
the distribution of voters’ ideal points is uncertain at the time of the primary race. 
As a consequence, all candidates running in the primary election prefer to remain 
vague and not to commit to a policy platform because when they do, they become 
vulnerable in the general election stage and are likely to be defeated by a candidate 
from the opposing party. This happens because the opposing candidate in this case 
is able to choose the winning platform since platforms chosen during the primary 
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race are known and cannot be altered at this stage; and the distribution of the voters’ 
ideal points is known with certainty at this moment.4
The second class of models, the current model included, considers voting games 
in which candidates signal their policy preferences to the voters to influence their 
chances of winning the elections. In particular, Banks (1990) shows that when mis-
representing one’s true ideological position (lying) is costly, extreme candidates tend 
to reveal their true positions while moderate ones tend to pool together. Callander 
and Wilkie (2007) extend Banks’s model to allow for heterogeneous costs of lying 
and find that, although liars are favored in the elections, the honest types are not 
always defeated. Kartik and McAfee (2007) study a related model, in which a frac-
tion of candidates have a “character” and are exogenously committed to campaign 
platforms. In a recent study, Kartik and Van Weelden (2015) consider an election 
model with nonbinding communication and show that under suitable conditions 
cheap-talk electoral announcements can be informative. The pandering behavior of 
politicians in this model is driven by reputation concerns, and it increases in voters’ 
uncertainty about politician type. The model presented in this paper departs from the 
above models in that we study two-stage elections, in which candidates face elec-
torates with different preferences in the primary and in the general election stages; 
and candidates can choose different platforms in each election stage.5 These crucial 
differences raise the question of how much information can we expect to be revealed 
in this two-stage election process.
Our model also belongs to the literature that investigates the effects of primary 
elections on candidates’ and voters’ behavior. Coleman (1972) and Owen and 
Grofman (2006) discuss the polarizing effect of primaries when candidates are con-
strained to offer the same platform in the general election as they had stated in the 
primary. Adams and Merrill (2008) demonstrate that candidates who have stronger 
campaign abilities are more likely to get elected in primaries. Several papers, includ-
ing Dekel and Piccione (2000, 2014), Battaglini (2005), Callander (2007), and Ali 
and Kartik (2012), explore sequential nature of the primary elections and investigate 
momentum effects that may arise in these environments.6 Hirano, Snyder, and Ting 
4 See also, Alesina and Holden (2008) for a model of electoral competition with campaign contributions, in 
which candidates announce a range of policy preferences rather than a single point in attempt to balance median 
voter preferences and those of campaign contributors. 
5 Kartik and McAfee (2007) consider an extension of the one-stage model, in which candidates who compete in 
the general election are selected by the primary election. Similar to my setup, in this model, a candidate must appeal 
to electorates with different preferences during the primary and during the general election. However, candidates 
are not allowed to adjust their platforms after the primary election. This ability to adjust platforms turns out to be 
an important feature of my model that generates flip-flopping behavior in equilibrium and produces a number of 
interesting predictions that I explore. 
6 Dekel and Piccione (2000) consider sequential elections with two alternatives and show that informative sym-
metric equilibria of a simultaneous voting game are equilibria in any sequential voting game as well. Battaglini 
(2005) shows that results of Dekel and Piccione (2000) are sensitive to the introduction of voting costs and possi-
bility of abstention. Ali and Kartik (2012) construct history-dependent equilibria that exhibit momentum effects, in 
which voters learn from the actions taken by previous voters. In this equilibrium, the authors show that even if voters 
are strategic, it is optimal for each voter to play history dependent strategies if other voters do so. In other words, 
the symmetry underlying Dekel and Piccione (2000) result is broken because if all voters condition on history then 
early votes are more informative than later votes. Callander (2007) introduces a behavioral assumption and shows 
the existence of bandwagons when the number of voters is infinite and voters have a desire to conform with the 
majority. Finally, Dekel and Piccione (2014) study sequential elections in which voters can choose when they cast 
their vote and explore how the timing of voting depends on voters’ preferences. 
VoL. 8 no. 2 65agranov: flip-flopping anD primary visibility
(2009) study a model of distributive politics and show that when the nominee of the 
party is elected through a primary election, core voters receive positive transfers, 
whereas they receive nothing when only the general election matters. This result 
is reminiscent of pandering behavior of candidates we characterize in the current 
paper, albeit very different setup and research questions.7
The most closely related paper to ours is that of Hummel (2010). Both the current 
model and that of Hummel (2010) consider two-stage elections with forward-look-
ing voters and both characterize an equilibrium, in which candidates pander towards 
the median of the primary to obtain the nomination and then shift to the center 
towards the position of the population median to increase their chances of winning 
in the general-election stage. However, the mechanisms behind flip-flopping behav-
ior of candidates are very different. In Hummel (2010), voters dislike when candi-
dates run on different platforms in the primary and in the general election because 
the mere fact of changing platforms indicates candidates’ valence characteristics. 
On the contrary, the mechanism proposed in this paper explores the asymmetry of 
information between candidates and voters: candidates know their policy prefer-
ences, while voters try to infer those from the campaign, and their ability to do so 
depends on the campaign visibility.
Finally, we note that to our knowledge this is the first paper that explores the divi-
sive-primary hypothesis in a purely informational context. Furthermore, the current 
model provides a unified framework that accounts for flip-flopping behavior of can-
didates and the divisive-primary effect in the same setup and shows that both effects 
originate from the trade-offs related to the timing of information transmission.
I. Election Game
In this section, we describe the primitives of our game. We start by outlining the 
timing, preferences and solution concept and then talk about the assumptions. The dis-
cussion of modeling choices and interpretations is deferred to the end of the section.
The players in the election game are two candidates from the Democratic party, 
k = A, B , and a continuum of voters. For a candidate  k , winning office requires defeat-
ing the other candidate in the primary election (stage 1) and then defeating Republican 
incumbent in the general election (stage 2). The timing of the game is as follows:
stage 0—Information Stage
•	 Nature	 independently	 draws	 the	 types	 of	 Democratic	 candidates	 	( t A ,  t B ) ∈  { L, M } 2 , where  L stands for Liberal and  M stands for Moderate. Each candi-
date is  L with probability  1 _2. Types are privately observed.
•	 There	 is	a	continuum	of	voters.	A	voter	 	j is characterized by an ideal policy 
z j ∈ [ 0, 1 ] . The subset of voters, those with ideal points  z j ∈ [ 0,  z ̅] , are regis-
tered Democrats.
7 There are many noticeable differences between the current model and that of Hirano, Snyder, and Ting, includ-
ing the main question under investigation. We focus on the information transmission and the selection of candidates 
in the two-stage elections, while Hirano, Snyder, and Ting study how the existence of primary elections affects the 
distribution of public resources. 
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•	 Nature	determines	locations	of	voters.	In	particular,	the	location	of	the	median	
voter  m ∈ [ 0, 1 ] is drawn from a cumulative distribution function (CDF)  F . 
The location of the median Democrat  d ∈ [ 0,  z ̅] is drawn from a CDF  G .
stage 1—Primary Election
•	 Each	candidate		k chooses an effort level  e 1 k ∈ [ 0, 1 ] for the primary campaign.
•	 	Signals	 	(  s 1 A ,  s 1 B ) ∈  { λ, μ} 2 regarding candidates’ types are generated for the 
two candidates, where  λ stands for liberal and  μ for moderate signal.
•	 All	voters	observe		(  s 1 A ,  s 1 B ) .
•	 Registered	Democrats	cast	their	vote	for	one	of	the	candidates.
•	 The	winner	of	the	primary	is	the	candidate	with	the	most	votes.	This	candidate	
becomes the nominee of the Democratic party and will henceforth be called the 
challenger.
stage 2—General Election
•	 The	 challenger	 chooses	 an	 effort	 level	 	 e 2 ch ∈ [ 0, 1 ] for the general election 
campaign.
•	 A	signal		 s 2 ch ∈ { λ, μ} regarding the challenger’s type is generated and observed 
by all voters.
•	 The	type	of	the	incumbent	is	common	knowledge,		 t inc = r .
•	 All	voters	cast	their	votes	for	one	of	the	candidates.
•	 The	winner	of	the	election	is	determined	by	the	majority	of	votes	cast.
•	 The	elected	politician	implements	a	policy	equal	 to	her	 type	and	payoffs	are	
determined.
A. Preferences
Candidates derive utility from winning the general election and bear costs of 
effort exerted during the campaigns. Specifically, we assume that utility of candidate 
k who exerted effort levels  e 1 k and  e 2 k in stages  1 and  2 , respectively, is
  Π k (  e 1 k ,  e 2 k ) =  [ 1 −  e 1 
k −  e 2 k  if k won general election   −  e 1 k −  e 2 k otherwise .
A voter  j with ideal policy  z j ∈ [ 0, 1 ] derives utility  u( z j , p)  = − ( z j − p) 2 when 
policy  p ∈ { L, M, r} is implemented. Voters are forward-looking Bayesian agents 
who cast their votes to maximize their expected utility given the information avail-
able to them.
B. Equilibrium concept
To analyze the outcomes of the election game, we characterize the Perfect 
Bayesian Equilibria (equilibria hereafter), restricting attention to those in which all 
voters hold the same beliefs about candidates’ types. We also focus on symmetric 
equilibria, in which candidates with the same type employ the same strategy at each 
VoL. 8 no. 2 67agranov: flip-flopping anD primary visibility
stage of the game. A voter who has a strict preference for one of the candidates 
is assumed to necessarily vote for this candidate, while a voter who is indifferent 
between two candidates is assumed to randomize and vote with equal probability for 
both. Abstention is not allowed.
C. Assumptions
The signal generated by candidate  k ’s campaign in stage  i depends on candidate 
 k ’s effort in stage  i , candidate  k ’s type and an exogenous parameter  n i ∈  r ++ , 
which captures the prominence of the election stage  i ∈ { 1, 2} . Candidates exert 
effort to distort the signal. Absent effort, the generated signal corresponds to the 
type of the candidate. It is harder to distort the signal in more prominent elections. 
More specifically, we assume that the probability that candidate  k ’s campaign gen-
erates liberal signal  λ if candidate  k exerted effort  e i k in stage  i in an election with 
prominence  n i is
  Pr   
 [  s i k = λ ] =  [ h( e i 
k , M,  n i ) if   t 
k = M   
1 − h( e i k , L,  n i ) if   t k = L . 
With the remaining probability candidate  k ’s campaign generates moderate signal 
μ . We refer to function  h( · ) as the scrutiny function and assume that it satisfies 
assumptions (A1a)–(A1f):
 (A1a)  h is twice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing and strictly concave 
in effort,  
∂ h(e, t, n) _______∂ e ≡  h e (e, t, n) > 0 and   ∂ 
2 h(e, t, n) ________∂ e 2  ≡  h ee (e, t, n) < 0 .
 (A1b)  lim 
e→0
 
  h e (e, t, n) = ∞ and  lim e→1
 
  h e (e, t, n) < 1.
 (A1c) Absent effort candidate’s signal coincide with her type,  h(0, t, n) = 0 .
 (A1d) Highest effort does not guarantee a signal opposite from candidate’s type, 
h(1, t, n) < 1 .
 (A1e) It is harder to generate a signal opposite to the candidate’s type in more prom-
inent elections,  
∂ h(e, t, n) _______∂ n ≡  h n (e, t, n) < 0 .
 (A1f) The signal is less responsive to candidate’s additional effort in more promi-
nent elections,  
∂ h e (e, t, n) ________∂ n ≡  h en (e, t, n) < 0 .
In addition, we make the following assumptions on the parameters of the election 
game:
 (A2) Candidates’ locations satisfy  0 < L < M < r < 1 .
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 (A3) The locations of registered Democrats are drawn independently from the loca-
tions of other voters and less than half of the voters are registered Democrats.
 (A4) The location of the median voter is drawn from a CDF  F , which is continu-
ous, strictly increasing, and differentiable on the support  [  m _,  m ̅ ] with density 
f (m) , where  z ̅ <  m _ <  r + L ____2 and  r + M ____2 <  m ̅ < 1 .
 (A5) The location of median Democrat is drawn from a CDF  G , which is contin-
uous, strictly increasing, and differentiable on the support  [ d _,  d ̅] with density 
g(d ) , where  0 <  d _ <  d ̅ < min { z ̅,  L + M ____2 } .
 (A6) The general election is at least as prominent as the primary race,  n 1 ≤  n 2 .
D. Discussion of Modeling choices and interpretations
The above assumptions pin down preferences of all registered Democrats (includ-
ing median Democrat) as well as location of median voter.
First, median voter is located to the right of the most conservative Democrat, 
m >  z ̅, which means that median voter is not a registered Democrat. This conclu-
sion follows from assumption (A3), which asserts that registered Democrats consti-
tute less than half of the electorate, and restrictions imposed on the support of CDF 
of median voter  F by assumption (A4).
Second, assumptions (A2) and (A5) ensure that median Democrat  d prefers lib-
eral type over moderate type over the incumbent,
  u(d, L) > u(d, M ) > u(d, r )   ∀ d ∈ [ d _,  d ̅] .
Third, all registered Democrats prefer to see any of the Democratic candidates in 
office over the incumbent, which follows from assumptions (A3) and (A4)
  min   
 { u(  z j , L), u(  z j , M )} > u(  z j , r )  ∀ z j ∈ [ 0,  z ̅] .
One of the main tensions in the model comes from a mismatch between the pref-
erences of the median Democrat who plays an important role in selecting the nom-
inee of the Democratic party and the preferences of the general election median 
who determines the final winner of the general election. Moreover, since registered 
Democrats, just like all voters in our model, are forward-looking expected utility 
maximizers, they have to weigh the probability of different challengers winning 
the general election as well as the proximity of their types compared to their most 
preferred policies.
The uncertainty about median voters captures unpredictability of the turnout in 
both election stages and its vulnerability to various shocks, such as weather, political 
scandals, and the economic environment, that may shift voters’ preferences before 
the election day. Technically, the uncertainty about general election median  m gener-
ates a continuous probability of winning general election function, which otherwise 
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would be a step function and significantly complicate the equilibrium characteriza-
tion. The uncertainty about the median Democrat  d is not essential for the results.
Prior to any election stage, be that the Democratic primary or the general elec-
tion, candidates campaign in an attempt to influence their chances of winning. For 
politicians, the campaigning process is modeled as choosing a costly effort level, 
which represents how hard a politician tries to misrepresent her own type and mimic 
the other type. For voters, the campaign process generates a signal about the type 
of the politician, which voters use to update their beliefs. The scrutiny function 
translates politicians’ efforts into the likelihood of generated signals through the 
prism of the prominence of the race. The prominence of the race represents all the 
factors related to the salience, informativeness, and visibility of a race such as how 
much time and resources voters devote to following this race, their ability to absorb 
campaign information, and the media coverage of the race.
Some of the assumptions imposed on the shape of the scrutiny function  h are 
technical, while others are tied to the interpretation. The later assumptions are as fol-
lows. A candidate that exerts no effort necessarily generates signal that corresponds 
to her type (assumption (A1c)).8 A candidate can never generate the signal opposite 
from her type with certainty (assumption (A1d)). The higher the effort, the higher 
is the likelihood of generating a signal opposite from one’s true type and the mar-
ginal increase in successful mimicking is decreasing in effort (assumption (A1a)). 
Further, for a given effort exerted by a candidate, the higher the prominence of a 
race, the more likely voters are to receive a signal that matches the true type of a can-
didate (assumption (A1e)), and the marginal increase of the successful mimicking 
function is decreasing in the prominence level of the election (assumption (A1f)).9
Each election stage is characterized by its own prominence level:  n 1 is the prom-
inence of the primary election and  n 2 is the prominence of the general election. Our 
basic model treats  n 1 and  n 2 as exogenous parameters and assumes that the general 
election race is at least as prominent as the primary race (assumption (A6)). In 
Section VB, we explore the model in which candidates can influence the promi-
nence of the primary election.
Finally, our basic model considers the information structure in which all vot-
ers, irrespective of whether they participate in the primary election or not, observe 
signals generated by the candidates’ campaigns during the primary election. In 
Section VA, we explore the importance of this assumption and consider a modified 
election game, in which voters who do not belong to the Democratic party do not 
observe signals from the primary election and maintain their prior belief that each 
Democratic nominee is equally likely to be moderate and liberal.
8 The role of this assumption is discussed in online Appendix B and in the intuition presented after Claim 3. 
9 For instance, the scrutiny function of the following type satisfies all imposed assumptions (A1a)–(A1f):
 h(e, t, n) = ϕ(n)  ·  e a   where a ∈ (0, 1) and  ∀ n we have  { ϕ(n )  ∈ (0, 1 )  ϕ′(n )  < 0      . 
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II. Pandering Equilibrium
We solve the model using a backward induction approach. We start by intro-
ducing notation, then characterize an equilibrium we term a pandering equilibrium 
(Theorem 1) and discuss the intuition behind its derivation through the series of 
claims. The complete proofs are presented in online Appendix A.
Since we focus on equilibria in which candidates with the same type employ the 
same strategy at each election stage, when we describe efforts of candidates we 
omit candidates’ names  k = A, B and instead use subscripts to indicate candidates’ 
types. Thus,   ( e i L ,  e i M ) denote effort levels of liberal and moderate types in election 
stage  i ∈ { 1, 2} . Moreover, we use  (  e ̂ i L ,  e ̂ i M ) to denote voters’ conjectures about 
efforts of liberal and moderate types in stage  i ∈ { 1, 2} , and  (  e i  L ∗  ,  e i  M ∗  ) to indicate 
the equilibrium effort levels of candidates in stage  i ∈ { 1, 2} .
Voters’ beliefs are summarized by the likelihood that a candidate is believed to 
be moderate. Since we focus on equilibria in which all voters hold the same beliefs 
about candidates’ types at each stage of the election, these beliefs can be summa-
rized by function  p i k ( · ) , which indicates the likelihood that candidate  k is believed 
to be moderate at the end of stage  i ∈ { 1, 2} . More precisely, voters’ belief regard-
ing the type of candidate  k in stage  i is a function of signal generated by candidate 
 k ’s campaign in stage  i , voters’ conjectures about effort levels of different candi-
dates in stage  i and voters’ belief about  k ’s type in the previous stage
  p i k ≡  p i k ( s i k ,  e ̂ i L ,  e ̂ i M ,  p i−1 k ) .
Note that in stage  i voters do not need to remember the exact signal generated 
by politician’s campaign in the previous stage. All necessary information is sum-
marized by the probability that this politician is a moderate type,  p i−1 k . When this 
does not create confusion, we will abuse the notation and write  p i k  ( s i k ) instead of 
 p i k  ( s i k ,  e ̂ i L ,  e ̂ i M ,  p i−1 k ) for  s i k ∈ { λ, μ} . Similarly, we will write  p 2 ch  ( s 2 ch ) to indicate 
voters’ belief about challenger’s type after they received signal  s 2 ch from challeng-
er’s general election campaign and  p 1 ch to indicate voters’ belief about challenger’s 
type at the end of the primary race, which is the prior for the general election stage.10
By the Bayes’ rule
 (1a)  p i k (μ) =   p i−1 
k  ( s i−1 k ) ·  (1 − h  ( e ̂ i M , M,  n i ) )      _____________________________________________      p i−1 k  ( s i−1 k ) ·  (1 − h (  e ̂ i M , M,  n i ) )  +  (1 −  p i−1 k   ( s i−1 k ) )  · h ( e ̂ i L , L,  n i )  
 (1b)  p i k (λ) =   p i−1 
k  ( s i−1 k ) · h ( e ̂ i M , M,  n i )     __________________________________________    p i−1 k  ( s i−1 k ) · h ( e ̂ i M , M,  n i ) +  (1 −  p i−1 k  ( s i−1 k ) ) · 1 − h ( e ̂ i L , L,  n i )  .
10 As the candidates can be only one of two types,  L or  M , we can use the posterior about one’s type from the 
previous stage of the election game as the prior for the next election stage. 
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We let  Eu ( z j ,  p 1 k  ( s 1 k) )  denote the expected utility of the voter who has ideal point 
z j when the winner of the primary stage is a candidate  k who generated a signal  s 1 k in 
the primary campaign and, thus, is believed to be moderate with probability  p 1 k  ( s 1 k) .
Finally, the chances of the challenger winning the general election can be summa-
rized by a function  W ( p 2 ch  ( s 2 ch ) ) , which we refer to as the winning general election 
function. This function specifies the likelihood that the challenger who is believed 
to be moderate with probability  p 2 Ch  ( s 2 ch ) ∈ [ 0, 1 ] at the end of the general election 
campaign wins the final vote.
CLAIM 1: Assume that the parameters of the election game satisfy assumptions 
(A2) and (A4). Then, the probability that the challenger wins the general election 
is strictly increasing in the belief she is a moderate type at the culmination of the 
general election campaign.
Claim 1 asserts that the higher the likelihood that the challenger is moderate, the 
higher are her chances of winning the election. Depending on the beliefs about chal-
lenger’s type at the end of the general election campaign,  p 2 Ch (  s 2 Ch ) , the winning 
general election function can be written as
(2)  W ( p 2 ch  ( s 2 ch ) ) = F [ 
 r 2 −  p 2 ch  ( s 2 ch ) ·  M 2 −  (1 −  p 2 ch  ( s 2 ch ) ) ·  L 2     ________________________________
2 ·  (r −  p 2 ch  ( s 2 ch ) · M −  (1 −  p 2 ch  ( s 2 ch ) ) · L)  ] ,
where  F is the CDF of the location of the median voter. Assumptions (A2) and (A4) 
guarantee that the argument and, thus, the winning general election function itself is 
strictly increasing in  p 2 ch  ( s 2 ch ) . Moreover,
 (3 )  0 < W(0) < W(1) < 1 ,
where  W(0) denote the likelihood that the challenger who was revealed to be liberal 
for sure wins the general election and, similarly,  W(1) denotes the likelihood that the 
challenger who was revealed to be moderate for sure wins the general election. Last 
inequality (3) means that both liberal and moderate candidates, if their types were 
revealed at some stage of the election game, have a positive but less than one chance 
of winning the general election.
Define  (x, y )  ∈ (0, 1 )  × (0, 1 ) that satisfy system of equations (4a) and (4b):
 
(4a)
 
(4b)
 
⎧
 
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
  h x (x, M,  n 1 ) ·  [ 3 − h(x, M,  n 1 )  ____________4 W(  p 2 ch (μ)) −  1 − h(x, M,  n 1 )  ____________4 W(1)] = 1      
 h y (y, L,  n 2 ) ·  [W(  p 2 ch (μ)) − W(0)] = 1,
 
where
 (5)  p 2 ch (μ) =  h(x, M,  n 1 )  ___________________ h(x, M,  n 1 ) + h(y, L,  n 2 )  .
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Further, for any  (x, y) ∈ (0, 1)  × (0, 1) that satisfy system of equations (4a) and 
(4b), define the cutoff value  M ̅ = γ(x, y)  · L + (1 − γ(x, y)) · r , where  p 2 ch (μ) is 
defined by equation (5), and function  γ : (0, 1) × (0, 1) → r is defined by equation 
(6)
(6)  γ(x, y) =  h(x, M,  n 1 ) · W(0)  + h(y, L,  n 2 ) ·  [W(  p 2 
ch (μ)) − W(0)]      ____________________________________________   
W(1) + h(x, M,  n 1 ) ·  [W(1) − W(  p 2 ch (μ))]  . 
Finally, define conditions (C1) and (C2) as follows:
 condition (C1): 2W(0)  > W(1) and function W( · ) is weakly concave
condition (C2): Eu( z i ∗ , 0)) ≥ Eu( z i ∗ , 1)) where   z i ∗ =  [ 0  if  M ≤  
_ M    _ d  if M >  _ M .
Conditions (C1) and (C2) play important roles in ensuring that the majority of the 
registered Democrats support the candidate whose type is uncertain over the can-
didate who was revealed to be moderate during the primary campaign (see detailed 
discussion in Claim 4). To preview this discussion, condition (C1) puts an upper 
bound on the advantage of a revealed moderate over a revealed liberal candidate 
in terms of likelihood of winning the general election stage. Condition (C2) iden-
tifies which Democratic voter has the “biggest hesitation” (smallest difference in 
expected utility terms) when choosing between a revealed liberal and a revealed 
moderate in the primary election: when the moderate candidate is relatively liberal, 
M ≤  _ M , then it is the most liberal voter  z j = 0 who “hesitates” the most; however, 
if the moderate candidate is relatively conservative,  M >  _ M , then it is the most 
conservative median Democrat  
_ d who “hesitates” the most.
THEOREM 1: Assume that the parameters of the election game satisfy assump-
tions (A1)–(A6) and conditions (c1) and (c2). Then, there exists a Pandering 
Equilibrium, in which effort levels of candidates are  ( e 1  M ∗  ,  e 1  L ∗  ,  e 2  M ∗  ,  e 2  L ∗  ) = (x, 0, 0, y) , where  (x, y) are defined above. if  s 1 l = μ and  s 1 k = λ , then candidate 
k wins the primary election for sure.
Theorem 1 asserts that there exists an equilibrium in which in the primary cam-
paign liberal politicians exert no effort, while moderate ones mimic liberal types 
to some extent. If one candidate generates liberal  λ signal, while another generates 
moderate  μ signal, then the former wins the primary race for sure, becomes the 
nominee of the Democratic party (challenger) and advances to the general election 
stage. If the Democratic nominee generated moderate signal in the primary race and 
still won the primary, then irrespectively of her type, she puts no effort in the general 
election campaign. If, however, the Democratic nominee generated the liberal signal 
and won the primary, then her behavior in the general election depends on her type: 
moderate challenger puts no effort, while liberal challenger mimics moderate to 
some extent and puts positive amount of effort.
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In the remainder of this section, we discuss main trade-offs faced by the voters 
and the candidates at different stages of the election game and provide intuition 
for the conditions (C1) and (C2). We start by analyzing the challenger’s behavior 
during the general election campaign (Claims 2 and 3), then discuss voters’ behav-
ior in the primary election (Claim 4) and, finally the behavior of Democratic candi-
dates during the campaign that precedes the primary election (Claim 5).
A. challenger’s Behavior in the General Election
The challenger’s behavior during the general election campaign depends on vot-
ers’ belief about her type carried over from the primary election.
CLAIM 2: Assume that the parameters of the election game satisfy assumptions 
(A1)–(A6). if the belief about challenger’s type at the beginning of the general elec-
tion stage is degenerate,  p 1 ch = 0 or  p ch = 1 , then she exerts no effort irrespec-
tively of her type. if, however, voters have even a small doubt about challenger’s 
type after the primary race, i.e.,  p 1 ch ∈ (0, 1) , then the unique equilibrium in the 
general election subgame prescribes the moderate challenger to exert no effort and 
the liberal challenger to put positive effort in mimicking the moderate type, where 
the amount of mimicking  e 2  L ∗  is determined by equation (3b) and
  p 2 ch (μ) =   p 1 
ch   ________________________    p 1 ch + (1 −  p 1 ch ) · h(  e 2  L ∗  , L,  n 2 ).
To intuit Claim 2, suppose that voters conjecture that the challenger exerts efforts 
( e ̂2 L ,  e ̂2 M ) in the general election campaign depending on her true type. Then, expected 
payoff of a moderate challenger if she exerts effort  e 2 M , denoted by  E  Π  t ch =M ( e 2 M ) , 
can be written as
    E  Π  t ch =M ( e 2 M ) = − e 2 M + W(  p 2 ch (μ))
  − h( e 2 M , M,  n 2 ) ·  [W(  p 2 ch (μ)) − W(  p 2 ch (λ))] .
Similarly, expected payoff of a liberal challenger if she exerts effort  e 2 L , denoted by 
E  Π  t ch =L (  e 2 L ) , can be written as
 E  Π  t ch =L (  e 2 L ) = − e 2 L + W(  p 2 ch (λ)) + h( e 2 L , M,  n 2 ) ·  [W(  p 2 ch (μ)) − W(  p 2 ch (λ))] ,
where  p 2 ch (μ) and  p 2 ch (λ) are determined based on the voters’ believed levels of 
candidates’ efforts  e ̂2 L and  e ̂2 M , as specified in equations (1a) and (1b). In other words, 
by choosing to put in higher or lower effort, the challenger can change the likelihood 
of generating moderate and liberal signals but not voters’ beliefs about her true type 
conditional on a received signal. Of course, in equilibrium, voters’ beliefs are cor-
rect and  e 2  k ∗  =  e 2 k =  e ̂2 k for  k ∈ { L, M } .
The only beliefs  (  e ̂2 L ,  e ̂2 M ) that are consistent with equilibrium behavior of chal-
lenger in the general election stage are the beliefs according to which the moderate 
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signal  μ indicates higher chance that challenger is truly moderate than the liberal 
signal  λ , that is,  p 2 ch (μ) >  p 2 ch (λ) . This is the reason that the moderate challenger 
chooses zero effort, which means that a liberal signal observed during the general 
 election campaign is perfectly informative,  p 2 ch (λ) = 0 . The optimal amount of 
effort for the liberal challenger is determined by the conditions that equate marginal 
benefit of effort to the marginal cost:
  
dE  Π  t ch =L (  e 2 L )  ____________
d e 2 L  = − 1 +  h e ( e 2 
L , L,  n 2 ) ·  [W(  p 2 ch (μ)) − W(0)] .
The marginal cost of extra unit of effort is one, while the marginal benefit takes 
into account both an increase in the likelihood of generating moderate signal and a 
higher chance of winning the general election conditional on a moderate rather than 
liberal signal being generated. The assumption  h e (0, L,  n 2 ) → ∞ guarantees that a 
liberal challenger always mimics the moderate type to some extent. The uniqueness 
of optimal effort of a liberal challenger follows from the properties of the probability 
winning and scrutiny functions, since higher belief  e ̂2 L reduces the marginal benefit 
of effort for liberal challenger.
Next we explore how an optimal amount of mimicking depends on voters’ beliefs 
about a challenger’s type carried over from the primary election,  p 1 ch .
CLAIM 3: Assume that the parameters of the election game satisfy assumptions 
(A1)–(A6) and voters are uncertain about a challenger’s type at the beginning of the 
general election stage,  p 1 ch ∈ (0, 1) . Then, the liberal challenger exerts more effort 
in pretending to be moderate during the general election campaign when prior on 
her being moderate at the beginning of the general election campaign is higher:
  
d e 2  L ∗   _____
d p 1 ch  > 0 .
To gain intuition for Claim 3, first note that absent any effort, either politi-
cian generates the signal associated with their type. Politicians must exert effort 
to obfuscate their type. As is often the case in signaling problems, both agents 
would like to appear to be the same type, in this case, the moderate type. So, the 
moderate type makes no effort obfuscating this signal and generates the moderate 
signal for sure. The liberal type’s returns from generating the misleading moderate 
signal will then depend on the prior in the following way. Conditional on gener-
ating the moderate signal, the liberal type can be either moderate or a liberal type 
who, through effort, generated the moderate signal. The stronger the prior on the 
moderate type, the more weight the electorate place on the former of these possi-
bilities and the greater the belief from generating the moderate signal. In contrast, 
regardless of the prior belief, liberal signal reveals that the challenger is liberal for 
sure. This leads the liberal type to exert more effort when the prior on her being 
moderate is higher.
VoL. 8 no. 2 75agranov: flip-flopping anD primary visibility
One of the important assumptions that Claim 3 uses is (A1c), which states that a 
candidate that exerts no effort generates signal corresponding to her type for sure.11 
To highlight the role of this assumption, consider a modified election model, in 
which a candidate that exerts no effort has a small but positive chance of generat-
ing a signal opposite from her type, that is,  h(0, t, n) = ϵ > 0 . All the remaining 
assumptions are the same as in the basic election model. Then, the optimal effort 
of the liberal challenger in the general election stage is a single-peaked function, 
which starts and finishes at zero for the degenerate beliefs  p 1 ch = 0 and  p 1 ch = 1 , 
respectively. However, as  ϵ approaches zero, the peak of this function shifts to the 
right, that is,  p 1 ch that maximizes  e 2  L ∗  (  p 1 ch ) approaches  one . In particular, for  ϵ = 0 , 
the optimal effort of the liberal challenger is strictly increasing in  p 1 ch on the domain (0, 1) but drops discontinuously at  p 1 ch = 1 to zero. We refer the reader to online 
Appendix B for the formal statement and proof of this result.
B. Primary stage
Now that we have determined the challenger’s behavior in the general election 
stage, we move back to the primary stage and discuss the behavior of primary vot-
ers. If posteriors about Democratic candidates at the end of the primary campaign 
are the same, then candidates are indistinguishable in the voters’ eyes and each 
candidate wins the nomination with equal probability. If, however, voters choose 
between a moderate for sure candidate and a candidate of uncertain type, then the 
uncertain type wins the nomination and advances to the general election stage.
CLAIM 4: Assume that the parameters of the election game satisfy assumptions 
(A1)–(A6) and conditions (c1) and (c2). Then, a Democrat who is believed to be 
moderate for sure at the culmination of the primary campaign period loses against 
a Democrat whose type is uncertain.
Primary voters are forward-looking and, thus, evaluate candidates running in the 
primary election taking into account both candidate’s ideology and her behavior in 
the general election campaign. All registered Democrats can be classified into two 
groups according to their rankings of candidates’ types:
  
Group 1 “Liberal Democratic Voters” 
 
u( z j , L) > u( z j , M ) > u( z j , r)
      
Group 2 “Conservative Democratic Voters” u( z j , M ) > u( z j , L) > u( z j , r). 
The exact location of most conservative Democrat  z ̅determines the composition of 
the Democratic party. If  z ̅ ≤  L + M ____2 , then the Democratic party consists of liberal 
Democratic voters only, while if  z ̅ ∈  ( L + M ____2 ,  L + r ____2 ) , then both liberal and conser-
vative Democratic voters are present.
11 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting we explore this further. 
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To see why a moderate candidate loses against an uncertain type in the primary 
election, we will consider the behavior of each of the groups separately. For a 
voter with ideal policy  z j ∈ [ 0,  z ̅] , define by  s( z j ) the difference in expected utility 
between the scenario in which the Democratic nominee is a candidate  k who, at the 
end of the primary stage, is believed to by moderate with probability  p 1 k ∈ (0, 1), 
and the scenario in which the Democratic nominee is candidate  l who is for sure 
moderate,  p 1 l = 1 . This difference can be written as
  s( z j ) = ϵ · [u(  z j , r) − u( z j , M ) + ψ · (u(  z j , L) − u(  z j , r))] ,
where  ψ =  (1 −  p 1 ) · W(0) +  
 p 1 (1 −  p 2 (μ)) ________ p 2 (μ) ·  (W(  p 2 (μ)) − W(0))    _______________________________ϵ ∈ (0, 1) and  ϵ = W(1) − 
p 1 · W(  p 2 (μ)) > 0 .
Conservative Democratic voters have  s( z j ) < 0 and, thus, will support a sure 
moderate over a candidate with uncertain type in the primary.12 On the contrary, lib-
eral Democratic voters support the uncertain over the sure moderate type provided 
that conditions (C1) and (C2) hold. In addition, these conditions guarantee that 
liberal Democratic voters constitute a majority of voters in the Democratic party.
To understand the role of conditions (C1) and (C2), consider the trade-off 
that liberal Democratic voters face. Just like any other voter in this game, liberal 
Democratic voters weigh relative importance of two factors that jointly determine 
their payoffs: candidates’ ideology and their chances of winning the general elec-
tion conditional on behaving optimally in the general election stage. In terms of 
ideology, liberal Democratic voters prefer a liberal over a moderate candidate, and, 
consequently, a candidate with an uncertain type over the moderate one. However, 
the latter has a higher chance of winning the general election if nominated than the 
former for any given level of the general election prominence  n 2 . The condition (C1) 
puts a restriction on how much more likely a sure moderate is to win the general 
election compared with a sure liberal challenger, which bounds an advantage that 
the moderate type has over the liberal ones in terms of likelihood of winning the 
general election. The condition (C2) distinguishes between two cases according to 
the location of the moderate candidate. If a moderate type is ideologically “close” 
to a liberal type, then it is enough to ensure that the most liberal Democratic voter, 
z j = 0 , prefers to nominate liberal over moderate type to guarantee that so do all 
other liberal Democratic voters. However, if a moderate type is ideologically far 
away from a liberal type, then as long as the most conservative median Democrat 
supports a liberal over a moderate type for the nomination, so will all other liberal 
Democratic voters.
CLAIM 5: Assume that the parameters of the election game satisfy assumptions 
(A1)–(A6) and conditions (c1) and (c2). Then, there exists an equilibrium, in 
which a liberal politician puts no effort in the primary campaign, while a moderate 
politician mimics behavior of a liberal one to some extent. The optimal amount of 
12 Indeed, for conservative Democratic voters  u( z j ), M ) − u( z j , r) > ψ ·  (u( z j , L) − u( z j , r)) , since ψ ∈ (0, 1) . This, coupled with  ϵ > 0 , guarantees that conservative Democratic voters have  s( z j ) < 0 . 
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mimicking is determined by the equation (3a), and  p 2 ch (μ) is determined by equa-
tion (4).
The final step in the characterization of the pandering equilibrium (Claim 5) nat-
urally follows from the behavior of the primary voters. Indeed, winning the primary 
election is a necessary step in winning the general election. Since primary voters 
reward politicians who are closer in the ideology to the policy preferred by the 
median Democrat, liberal types are happy to exert no effort in the primary campaign 
and moderate types have an incentive to mimic liberal types by exerting positive 
effort.
III. Comparative Statics of Pandering Equilibrium
In this section we consider how optimal behavior of politicians changes in 
response to changes in the environment, as captured by changes in the prominence 
levels of the primary and the general election campaigns,  ( n 1 ,  n 2 ) . We then use these 
comparative statics results to derive the “divisive-primary” effect.
For the purpose of deriving comparative statics results, we will introduce one 
more restriction on the shape of the scrutiny function:
  condition (C3): − h ee (e, t, n) · h(e, t, n) ≥  h e 2 (e, t, n) ∀ e ∈ [0, 1 ] .
The condition (C3) focuses on the subset of scrutiny functions that exhibit a rela-
tively high degree of concavity. This condition ensures that equilibrium effort levels 
of the candidates can be ranked according to visibility of the primary race. For 
instance, if  h(e, t, n) = ϕ(n) ·  e a , where  ϕ(n) ∈ (0, 1) and  ϕ′(n) < 0 , then condi-
tion (C3) is satisfied as long as  a ∈ ( 0,  1 _2] .
CLAIM 6: Assume that the parameters of the election game satisfy assumptions 
(A1)–(A6), conditions (c1)–(c3), and voters and candidates are playing the pan-
dering equilibrium described in Theorem 1. Then, we expect less pandering by both 
types of candidates in elections with more prominent primary races. That is, moder-
ate candidates exert less effort in the primary race,  
∂ e 1  M ∗   ____∂ n 1  < 0 , and liberal challeng-
ers exert less effort in the general election race,  
∂ e 2  L ∗   ____∂ n 1  < 0 . Moreover, voters believe 
the likelihood that a moderate type generates signal  λ in the primary and signal  μ 
in the general election is lower when the primary race is more prominent.
Intuitively, higher prominence of the primary race has two effects. First, it 
decreases the proportion of moderate candidates who reach the general election, as 
voters are better at detecting and filtering moderates in the primary race. Moderate 
candidates react to this by putting less effort in mimicking liberals in the primary 
race. Second, it discourages liberal challengers from exerting effort in the general 
election stage since voters put lower probability on the challenger being a  moderate 
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type after observing a liberal signal in the more prominent primary race (see 
Claim 3). The first effect decreases the likelihood that a liberal signal in the primary 
and a moderate signal in the general election is coming from the moderate type, 
while the second effect works in the opposite direction. The first effect, however, 
dominates the second one due to only partial adjustment of the effort level on the 
part of liberal challengers. Therefore, voters believe that the likelihood that a mod-
erate candidate produced a liberal signal in the primary and a moderate signal in the 
general election is smaller when the candidates’ selection process in the primary 
stage is more intense.
This comparative statics result translates directly into the chances of the 
Democratic Party to win the general election as described in Claim 7.
CLAIM 7: “Divisive Primary Effect.” Assume that the parameters of the election 
game satisfy assumptions (A1)–(A6), conditions (c1)–(c3), and voters and can-
didates are playing the pandering equilibrium described in Theorem 1. Then, the 
higher the prominence of the primary election race, the lower are the chances of the 
Democratic Party to win the general election.
Primaries with high visibility affect the probability of a Democrat to get elected 
through two distinct channels. First, primaries with high visibility make it harder 
for a moderate candidate to obtain the nomination, since these candidates are more 
likely to be detected and defeated by liberals in the primary race. Second, liberal 
candidates that obtain the nomination are handicapped in the general election cam-
paign because of the informative prior they carry over after the informative prima-
ries as described by Claim 3. Both effects are detrimental to the Democratic Party, 
which loses overall elections more often when primaries are more visible.
Finally, Claim 8 speaks to the effect of increasing general election visibility on 
the equilibrium behavior of candidates and chances of the Democratic Party to win 
the election.
CLAIM 8: Assume that the parameters of the election game satisfy assumptions 
(A1)–(A6), conditions (c1)–(c3), and voters and candidates are playing the pan-
dering equilibrium described in Theorem 1. Then, in the elections with a more prom-
inent general election race, we expect moderate candidates to put in more effort in 
the primary campaign,  
∂ e 1  M ∗   ____∂ n 2  > 0 , and liberal challengers to be revealed as liberals 
more often during the general election campaign,  
dh( e 2  L ∗  , L,  n 2 )__________ 
d n 2  < 0 .
In the elections, in which the second (general election) stage is more visible, 
moderate candidates factor in that liberal challengers are going to lose more often 
in the second stage, because voters subject them to a higher scrutiny process. This 
increases the chances of moderates winning the general election vote conditional 
on obtaining nomination, which provides an extra incentive to invest in winning the 
primary. This motivates moderate candidates to put in higher effort in the primary 
campaign when general elections are more prominent.
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IV. Extensions of the Model
In this section, we consider two extensions of the basic model developed above. 
The first extension revisits the informational structure of the model and explores 
the situation in which part of the general election electorate is ignorant about events 
that transpire during the primary election. The second extension takes a first step at 
exploring how primary prominence is determined and studies the game, in which 
candidates can affect primary visibility via costly investments.
A. information structure
In this extension, we explore how robust pandering equilibrium is to the changes 
in the information structure of the election game. In particular, we consider the situ-
ation, in which only registered Democrats,  z j ∈ [ 0,  z ̅] , observe signals generated by 
candidates’s campaigns in the primary. The remaining voters,  z j ∈ ( z ̅, 1 ] , are igno-
rant about what has transpired during the primary and believe that any Democratic 
nominee has an equal chance of being a liberal or a moderate type. Besides this 
informational assumption, the remaining details about the election game are the 
same as in the basic model studied in Sections II to IV. We refer to this version of the 
election game as the election game with partially informative primaries.13
Define  (q, r) ∈ (0, 1) × (0, 1) that satisfy system of equations (7a) and (7b):
 (7a) (7b)  { 
  h q (q, M,  n 1 ) ·  1 __2 W(  p 2 ch (μ)) = 1   
  h r (r, L,  n 2 ) ·  [W(  p 2 ch (μ)) − W(0)] = 1,
 
where
(8)  p 2 ch (μ) =  1 ___________ 1 + h(r, L,  n 2 )  .
Conditions (C1) and (C2) are defined the same way as in the basic model, where 
(q, r ) defined by the system of equations (7a) and (7b) take place of  (x, y) defined 
in Section III.
THEOREM 2: consider the election game with partially informative primaries and 
assume that parameters of the game satisfy assumptions (A1)–(A6) and conditions 
(c1) and (c2). Then, there exists a Pandering Equilibrium, in which effort levels 
of candidates are
  ( e ̃1  M ∗  ,  e ̃1  L ∗  ,  e ̃2  M ∗  ,  e ̃2  L ∗  ) =  (q, 0, 0, r) ,
where  (q, r ) are defined by the system of equations (7a) and (7b). If  s 1 l = μ and 
s 1 k = λ , then candidate  k wins the primary election for sure.
13 All the proofs are presented in online Appendix C. 
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Theorem 2 asserts that the existence of pandering equilibrium is robust to the 
change in the informational structure of the election game. In particular, in spite of 
the primaries being observed only by the subset of the electorate, moderate candi-
dates exert positive effort during the primary campaign in order to increase chances 
of winning the primary, while liberal challengers exert positive effort in the general 
election just like in the basic election game.
CLAIM 9: Effort levels of candidates in the election game with partially informative 
primaries are weakly higher than those in the basic election game, that is,
  e 1  M ∗  <  e ̃1  M ∗   and   e 2  L ∗  <  e ̃2  L ∗  .
The main reason that candidates exert higher efforts in the election game with 
partially informative primaries compared to the basic model is the difference in 
median voter’s beliefs regarding the challenger’s type at the beginning of the general 
election stage. Since the most conservative Democratic voter is not too conserva-
tive (assumption (A4)), a median voter in the general election is not a registered 
Democrat and, thus, she does not observe primary campaign in the election model 
with partially informative primaries. Therefore, the median voter believes that the 
challenger is equally likely to be a moderate or a liberal type,  p ̃1 ch =  1 _2, where  p ̃1 ch 
denotes the belief of the voters with ideal points  z j ∈ ( z ̅, 1] regarding the type of the 
challenger at the beginning of the general election stage in the game with partially 
informative primaries. On the contrary, in the basic election game, the median voter 
observes signals generated by candidates in the primary campaigns and updates her 
beliefs using the Bayes’ rule. In particular, a challenger who generated a liberal sig-
nal in the primary campaign is believed to be a liberal type with higher chance than 
a moderate type,  p 1 ch (λ) =  h( e 1 
 M ∗  , M,  n 1 )  ____________ 
1 + h( e 1  M ∗  , M,  n 1 ) <  
1 _2, while a challenger who generated 
a moderate signal in the primary campaign is believed to be moderate for sure, 
p 1 ch (μ) = 1 . Since liberal challengers exert higher efforts in the general election 
when their prior is higher (Claim 3), the liberal challenger will put in higher effort 
in the game with partially informative primaries than in the basic game,  e 2  L ∗  <  e ̃2  L ∗  . 
Moreover, since higher belief about a challenger’s type has a direct effect on the 
likelihood of winning the general election for the moderate candidates,  
d p 2 ch (μ) ______
d p 1 ch  > 0 
and  W′(  p 2 ch ) > 0 , moderate candidates are incentivized to put in higher effort lev-
els in the primary election in order to increase their chances of winning the primary 
and advancing to the general election stage, that is,  e 1  M ∗  <  e ̃1  M ∗  .
CLAIM 10: The chances of a Democrat winning the election are higher in the game 
with partially informative primaries than in the basic game.
Several effects contribute to this result. First, moderate candidates win primary 
elections more often when primaries are partially informative, and this increases 
the chances of the Democratic party winning the general election as moderate 
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 challengers win the second stage more often than liberal challengers. Second, the 
median voter has higher belief about the challenger’s type at the beginning of the 
general election stage when primaries are partially informative, compared with the 
basic model when a challenger generated a liberal signal during the primary cam-
paign. This, in turn, increases the chances of winning the second stage for both mod-
erate and liberal challengers who generate a moderate signal in the general election 
stage. Third, liberal challengers put in higher effort in the general election stage, and 
thus, increase even further their chances of winning the general election. Finally, 
the challenger who was revealed to be moderate in the primary and still won the 
nomination has a lower chance of winning the general election when primaries are 
partially informative. This happens because the information revealed during the pri-
mary never gets to the median voter who is not registered Democrat. However, the 
first three positive effects outweigh the last negative effect, and, overall the chances 
of a Democrat winning the general election are higher when primaries are only par-
tially informative.
B. Endogenous Primary Prominence
While some characteristics of the political competition are less likely to be 
influenced by candidates’ behavior (such as the capacity of voters to absorb infor-
mation), there are other characteristics that are surely manipulable by candidates. 
For instance, candidates can spend financial and political resources to advertise 
the importance of a particular race through media outlets, and by this, affect how 
much time and attention voters devote to a particular race, which, in turn, will 
affect the prominence of the race. To explore these strategic considerations, we 
consider a modified election game, in which candidates can influence primary 
visibility via costly investment that precedes the primary race. This investment 
stage happens after candidates learn their types but before the primary campaign 
begins.
Specifically, after nature determines the types of candidates, each Democratic 
candidate privately and simultaneously chooses whether to invest an amount  c > 0 
to increase primary visibility from level  n _1 to  n ̅1 , where  n ¯1 <  n ̅1 ≤  n 2 . These investments map probabilistically into the actual prominence level of the primary 
race: the probability that primary prominence is  n ̅1 is higher when both candidates 
invest, intermediate if only one candidate invests, and the smallest when no candi-
date invests. To abstract away from additional signaling channel that such invest-
ments provide to candidates, we maintain the assumption that for any realized level 
of primary prominence, voters believe that each candidate is equally likely to be a 
moderate or a liberal type and each Democratic candidate holds the same beliefs 
about her opponent in the primary race. The remaining details of the election game 
are the same as in the basic model studied in Sections II to IV. We will refer to 
this version of the election game as the election game with endogenous primary 
prominence.14
14 All the proofs are presented in online Appendix D. 
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THEOREM 3: consider the election game with endogenous primary prominence 
and assume that parameters of the game satisfy assumptions (A1)–(A6) and con-
ditions (c1)–(c3). Then for  c <  c ̅ this game has a Pandering Equilibrium with 
Separation in the Investment Stage, in which liberal candidates invest in increas-
ing primary visibility, while moderate candidates refrain from doing so. once the 
primary prominence is determined based on investment decisions of candidates, 
 n 1 ∈ { n _1 ,  n ̅1 } , both candidates and voters play the Pandering Equilibrium described 
in Theorem 1 for a given  n 1 .
To prove Theorem 3, it is enough to show that expected payoff of a liberal can-
didate increases in primary visibility, and expected payoff of a moderate candidate 
decreases in primary visibility. Expected payoff of a liberal candidate,  E  Π  t k =L , 
when both voters and candidates play pandering equilibrium given prominence level 
of the primary race  n 1 , can be written as
 E  Π  t k =L =  3 − h(  e 1  M 
∗  , M,  n 1 )  _______________
4
 ·  [− e 2  L ∗  + W(0) + h( e 2  L ∗  , L,  n 2 ) 
 ·  [W ( h(  e 1  M 
∗  , M,  n 1 )_________________________   
h( e 2  L ∗  , L,  n 2 ) + h( e 1  M ∗  , M,  n 1 )) − W(0)] ] , 
where the first fraction represents the probability that liberal candidate wins the 
nomination and the expression in the brackets represents the expected payoff of a 
liberal candidate conditional on advancing to the general election stage and behav-
ing as pandering equilibrium prescribes.
Higher primary visibility defers moderate candidates from exerting high effort in 
the primary campaign, which increases the chances of a liberal candidate winning 
the nomination. This increases the expected payoff of a liberal candidate. At the 
same time, low effort of moderate candidates lowers voters’ belief about a liberal 
challenger that is carried over to the general election stage. The liberal challengers 
react to this reduction in beliefs by lowering their effort in the general election cam-
paign. As a result, expected payoff of a liberal challenger conditional on winning 
the nomination is smaller when the primary is more prominent. However, the first 
(positive) effect outweighs the second (negative) effect and overall expected payoff 
of a liberal candidate increases with primary visibility.
On the contrary, moderate candidates suffer from an increase in primary visibil-
ity. Expected payoff of a moderate candidate,  E  Π  t k =M , when both voters and candi-
dates play pandering equilibrium for a given  n 1 , can be written as
 E  Π  t j =M = − e 1  M ∗   +  h( e 1 
 M ∗  , M,  n 1 )(3 − h( e 1  M ∗  , M,  n 1 ))_____________________________  
4
 
 · W ( h( e 1 
 M ∗  , M,  n 1 )_________________________   
h( e 2  L ∗  , L,  n 2 ) + h( e 1  M ∗  , M,  n 1 )) +   (1 − h( e 1 
 M ∗  , M,  n 1 )) 2 _________________
4
  · W(1) ,
VoL. 8 no. 2 83agranov: flip-flopping anD primary visibility
where the first term is the cost of exerting equilibrium effort level  e 1  M ∗  ; the second 
term is expected payoff of the moderate candidate conditional on generating liberal 
signal  λ during the primary; and the third term is the expected payoff of a moderate 
candidate conditional on generating moderate signal  μ during the primary. Recall 
that primary voters elect an uncertain type over the sure moderate type, which means 
that if signals generated by the candidates are different, then the winner of the pri-
mary is the candidate that generated a liberal signal. This means that the only pos-
sible scenario in which a candidate who generated moderate signal in the primary 
advances to the the general election stage is the situation in which both candidates 
were revealed to be moderate during the primary campaign (which is captured by 
the third term in  E  Π  t k =M ). While higher primary prominence decreases the effort 
of a moderate candidate during the primary, and, consequently, increases the first 
and the third term, the main effect comes from the second term, according to which 
moderate candidates are more likely to lose the primary, and conditional on winning 
the primary after generating liberal signal, they are more likely to lose the general 
election (see Claim 6).
To sum up, it is a liberal candidate who enjoys higher prominence of the primary 
race, while a moderate one prefers to minimize it.
V. Conclusions
In this paper, we develop a signaling model of two-stage elections in which candi-
dates must obtain their party’s nomination before competing in the general election. 
Candidates can choose different campaign platforms in every stage of the election, 
and a candidate who misrepresents his true type and wins the election incurs costs 
(of lying). We allow different stages of the election to have different prominence or 
visibility levels and demonstrate that these play an important role in the selection 
process of candidates.
This model provides a unified framework that allows us to examine two com-
monly observed patterns about primaries: the “post-primary moderation effect,” in 
which candidates pander to the party base during the primary and shift to the center 
once the nomination is secured; and the “divisive-primary effect,” which refers to 
the detrimental effect of hard-fought and prominent primaries on a party’s gener-
al-election prospects.
We finish by noting that the timing of information revelation is important in two-
stage elections, as it affects who gets elected and which policies are implemented. 
While prominent primaries allow primary voters to make a more informative choice, 
they are also dangerous for the party in the sense that they reveal too much infor-
mation about their candidates too early, and this then hurts the party’s chances of 
winning general elections.
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